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 Political Business as Usual – Comparing Public-Private 
Partnerships in East and Southeast Asia1 
 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt2
 
Most commentators have denounced the Asian financial crisis as the end of 
authoritarian state-directed capitalism. The crisis emerged with the devaluation of 
the Thai baht in July 1997 and quickly escalated to encompass most of the 
economies in East and Southeast Asia. Those events lead to a proliferation of 
explanations about the origins of the financial crisis, of which the four most 
common are the neoliberal view, an international conspiracy, financial panic and 
changes in political and social power at both the domestic and international levels.3 
The most important explanation in terms of its direct policy implications is the 
neoliberal view, associated with the “Washington Consensus”,4 which argues that 
corruption and nepotism were the central factors that contributed to the crisis. 
  
Let it be clear from the outset that this essay does not subscribe to the explanation 
that one of the major factors which triggered the crisis was a unique East Asian 
model of statism creating distortions and inefficiencies and involving a specific 
mode of cronyism with the direct consequence of misallocation of resources. 
Although this type of approach is the most common explanation for what caused a 
world wide scale crisis, it is also being used by the neoliberal ‘Washington 
consensus’ to reassert US strategic power and supremacy in the region through the 
increasing internationalisation of capital. Accordingly one scholar notes that the 
world economy is characterised by intense interstate conflict over the form and 
direction of regional and global patterns of capitalist development. Central to US 
strategy is the imposition of a specific neoliberal model of restructuring. In the 
context of recent crises, state-directed and controlled forms of political economy  
                                                 
1 This is a slightly revised version of a paper presented at an international workshop “Political 
Business in East Asia” held at DIR, Aalborg University 4-5 June 1999. The workshop was co-
organised by Research Center on Development and International Relations, Aalborg 
University, Department of East Asian Studies, Leeds University and Nordic Institute for 
Asian Studies, Copenhagen. The paper has benefited from comments by Terence Gomez.  
2  Associate Professor and Co-ordinator of DIR, Aalborg University. 
3 For a brief and concise discussion on each of these four explanations, see Mark Beeson and 
Andrew Rosser (1999), ‘The East Asian Crisis: A Brief Overview of the Facts, the Issues and the 
Future’, Working Paper No. 86, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University. 
4 The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the US Treasury Department and 
the White House in Washington who formulate, plan and implement the hegemony of neo-
liberalism.  
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have been, and are being, pressured to liberalize.”5 These neo-liberal arguments 
rely on a critique of the East Asian model for giving unfair advantage to local (as 
opposed to foreign) capital through state subsidies and political patronage. The 
solution is a free market system (which is ostensibly more efficient and transparent) 
stor interests and the maximisation of shareholder values.6based on inve  
Although the position of this contribution contradicts the solution that the 
imposition of a free market system is the panacea to the financial crisis as well as a 
deterrent to its re-occurrence, it is also true that the large current account deficits 
and the loss of competitiveness with its resulting decrease in exports and attacks on 
currencies is an inadequate explanation for the crisis. This paper argues that the 
pressures arising from globalisation, which affected checks and balances provided 
by state regulation over the economy, or what Peter Evans has termed the 
embedded autonomy of the state, was a major contributory factor to the crisis.7  
  
In this regard then, the financial crisis is more related to what Peter Drucker has 
termed as a social crisis. However, there is no doubt that the crisis is also a crisis of 
neoliberal globalisation, and the reinvention of nationalist economies, primarily 
through forms of protectionism and control of foreign capital. The resistance 
against neoliberal globalisation and foreign control of the local economies will 
once again become much stronger – in compliance with what Polanyi termed the 
double movement – potentially strengthening local and democratic control over the 
economies.8  
                                                 
5 Stephen Gill (1999), ‘The Geopolitics of the Asian Crisis’, Monthly Review 50 (10), March, p. 
1.  
6 The causes of the East Asian crisis cannot be explained at the ideological level alone. Other 
explanations for the cause of the crisis have been offered, four of which are worth mentioning: i) 
global overproduction and the fact that all economies gave preference to an export-oriented 
development model; ii) forced deregulation of financial and monetary control in East Asia by the 
IMF, World Bank and OECD in collboration with international capital; iii) the revaluation of the 
Yen and later on the devaluation of the Chinese Renminbi which caused tremendous competitive 
pressure on the export-oriented economies adding to chronic overproduction; and iv) the growing 
influence and pressures from national business sectors on policymakers to prematurely deregulate 
the financial sectors. The result was overborrowing by the private market actors and a typical 
private sector debt crisis. Since significant segments of the private sector had become dependent 
on foreign finance, well illustrated by the unserviceable private sector debt problem, this also 
indicates that weak state regulation had allowed the private sector unrestricted access to 
international finance. Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt (2000), ‘Neoliberal Globalisation, Social 
Welfare and Trade Unions in Southeast Asia’, in Barry Gills (ed.), Globalization and the Politics 
of Resistance, London: Macmillan, p. 236. 
7 According to Evans, the efficacy of the ‘embedded autonomy’ of the developmental state 
“depends on a meritocratic bureaucracy with a dense set of institutionalized links to private 
elites.” Peter Evans (1989), ‘Preadatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative 
Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State’, Sociological Forum 4 (4), p. 561. 
 
8 In nicely capsulated title, a Japanese official, Eisuke Sakakibara, from the Ministry of Finance 
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The idea then that the concept ‘political business’ can offer insights into what 
caused the crisis has strategic as well as ideological consequences which must be 
taken into consideration. This, however, also questions whether the term political 
business is a unique East Asian variant of capitalism. There are historical and 
contemporary examples of cosy business-politics relationships in other countries, 
including the United States, Latin America, the former USSR and Eastern Europe, 
not to mention the European Union countries. Such alliances might also explain 
why Taiwan and China escaped the financial crisis in 1997 in spite of the fact that 
political business is just as prevalent in these two countries as in other parts of East 
Asia. To contend then that the crisis occurred because dirigisme and crony 
capitalism was extensive is both simplistic and unidimensional. 
  
This paper argues that political business is a strategy pursued by most late-comers 
and a universally applied type of statism deliberately applied to catch-up in the 
global economy. What makes the strategy extremely vulnerable in East Asia is the 
fact that most countries, except the first-comer Japan, and also South Korea and 
Taiwan, have relied heavily on foreign capital as a primary engine in capital 
accumulation thus running the risk of retarded uneven development and over-
reliance on external factors and actors i.e. a classical example of dependency. In the 
ideal type East Asian model as it developed first in Japan, and later on in South 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, and to a much lesser degree in Malaysia, Thailand, 
Indonesia and the Philippines, the nature of co-operative, long-term, reciprocal 
relations between companies, financial institutions and state agencies had evolved 
significantly before the advent of the crisis. As a matter of fact, the question 
regarding timing is of outmost importance in this regard as political business 
alliances are never static. 
  
The paper is divided into three parts. Apart from the introduction the next  part is 
devoted to a discussion on the differences between first-, second- and third-tier NIC 
economic development strategies in East Asia, and a distinction is made between 
kleptocratic, predatory and developmental states. The third section deals with the 
heavy dependence of the states in the latter category NIC countries in Southeast 
Asia on foreign capital to generate rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s. 
From the mid- to late 1980s, after massive internal and external pressures to 
deregulate, liberalise and privatise the financial markets, the impact of the collusion 
between well-connected or influential private market actors and (usually) (usually) 
short-term financial capital is assessed. The argument is made that extensive 
liberalisation and deregulation of the economy had grave consequences for the 
nature of political business alliance which led to the ascendancy of capital over the 
                                                                                                                                                        
showed East Asian frustration with the imposition of US hegemony in the region with a speech 
entitled ‘The End of Market Fundamentalism’. See Gill, op cit., p. 8. 
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state. The final section rounds up the often heated debate concerning which role is 
appropriate of the state in economic development in the future, especially taking 
into consideration that globalisation of both markets and politics seem irreversible 
in the near future. 
 
New Wine in Old Bottles: Nurtured Political Business Alliances in East Asia 
When Woodrow Wilson was President of the United States, he wrote: “Suppose 
you go to Washington and try to get at your government. You will always find that 
while you are politely listened to, the men really consulted are the men who have 
the biggest stake - the big bankers, the big manufacturers, the big masters of 
commerce, the heads of railroad corporations and of steamship corporations... The 
masters of Government of the United States are the combined capitalists and 
manufacturers of the United States.” 9 While it is true that those with economic 
power dominate US politics, it is also a truism that irrespective of type of regime, 
money plays a dominant role in politics. This then raises the question whether 
political business is a phenomenon specific to Asia or if it is an inescapable part of 
successful catching-up capitalism?  
  
The answer to this question is self-fulfilling: State intervention in the economy has 
been a major characteristic of all late developing economies. Unlike the private 
entrepreneur who is conditioned to respond to market events to maximise profits, 
political business actors (or state entrepreneurs) simultaneously respond to three 
sets of incentives: market profits, the rewards structured within the party and state 
hierarchy, and in some cases social and communal demands from their 
constituencies.10 One might be tempted to use the category ‘bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs’ when referring to political business actors since we are talking about 
party and government officials engaged in revenue-generating activities aimed at 
promoting economic expansion using a vast array of institutional power within the 
state.11  
  
Even in the case of the US, during the catching-up process, economic historians 
have shown that “American industrialization was aided significantly by the intimate 
association of government and business. The railroad magnates were among the 
most important entrepreneurs in the American industrial revolution. Through 
bribery, chicanery and fraud, they amassed great personal fortunes. The federal 
government responded by generously giving federal lands to the railroads... Toward 
                                                 
9 Woodrow Wilson (1914), The New Freedom, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, pp. 57-58. 
Quoted in E. K. Hunt and J. Sherman (1972), Economics: An Introduction to Traditional and 
Radical Views, New York: Harper and Row, p. 302. 
10 See also Lance L. P. Gore (1997), ‘Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs: Politically and Socially 
Embedded Economic Actors’, Working Paper No. 83, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch 
University, pp. 3-4 and 17. 
11 For a further discussion on the term ‘bureaucratic entrepreneurs’, see Gore, ibid. 
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the end of the nineteenth century, the relationship ... became a symbiosis in which 
the government governed in ways big business wanted it to govern and big business 
furnished the money, organization, and power structure through which politicians 
could come to power in the federal government.”12 This form of political business 
has lasted until today, most manifest in the way big business funds presidential 
election campaigns.13
  
In the case of Germany, Bismarck’s bureaucracy, building on the thoughts of 
Friedrich List,14 created and nurtured a strong domestic business sector but one 
which had a symbiotic relationship with the state. Paul Sweezy stressed that “the 
ruling alliance of Junckers and capitalists has combined the reactionary and military 
stick features of feudalism with the economic strength and expansionism of a 
highly dynamic capitalism.”15 This pattern was repeated during the Fascist Hitler 
regime and again with the privatisation of the East German state property by 
Treuhaltanstalt after the demise of Soviet-type socialism.  
  
A similar pattern of state-business collusion occurred in late 19th century Japan 
where the Meiji government built its own factories in key industries in order to 
catch up with the advanced nations of the West. These factories were then sold by 
the state to favoured private businessmen at ridiculously low prices. Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi, among Japan’s leading enterprises (or zaibatsu), were developed 
through such state patronage. A similar system of patronage has existed since the 
immediate post-World War II period.16
  
It can be argued that this form of state guidance of the economy in the US, 
Germany and Japan has been replicated in what is now termed political business 
relationships in the second-tier NICs in East and Southeast Asia, though with 
seemingly less success in Southeast Asia. However, as noted above, while political 
business alliances can become a strategy to channel available funds to strategic 
industries in a late-starting and capital-scarce country, if rents are created without 
the enforcement of a developmental quid-pro-quo by the beneficiaries, the strategy 
will have adverse effects on the economy.17
                                                 
12 Hunt and Sherman, ibid, pp. 318-19. 
13 This was evidently clear when Bill Clinton was elected President with the aid of big capital in 
Wall Street as well as from Asia. See the article by Nicholas Kristoff with David E. Sanger, ‘How 
U.S. Wooed Asia to Let Cash Flow’, New York Times (16 February 1999). 
14 An in-depth discussion of Friedrich List’s views on the benefits of the links between the state 
and business to promote economic development is provided later in this paper. 
15 Paul Sweezy (1953), The Present as History, New York: Monthly Review Books, pp. 224-25. 
16 See ‘Graft and the System’, Far Eastern Economic Review (6 August 1976, p. 80). 
 
17 See Peter Evans (1999), ‘Transferable Lessons? Re-examining the Institutional Prerequisites of 
East Asian Economic Policies’, in Yilmaz Akyüz (ed.), East Asian Development: New 
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It would also be entirely wrong to assert that the type of political business 
observable in late-comers does not occur in developed countries as well. Examples 
are legion of the privatisation programmes in England, France and Italy and in 
Asia’s Anglo-Saxon neighbours New Zealand and Australia which confirm the 
practise of a system of political patronage that has been implemented which in 
many cases has not been seen in the national interests. For example, while the 
privatisation policy has been heavily criticised in England, 18 in Australia, 
allegations are rife of “over-familiarity between leading politicians and big 
business.”19 This suggests that the relationship between business and the state in 
East Asia is not that peculiar as some theorists’ and for instance the World Bank 
claims. 
  
The World Bank Report 1991 identified four key features of East Asian policies 
and interventions that are important. First, these economies were noted for their 
outward orientation. Second, East Asia made sizeable and efficient investment in 
people. Third, the macroeconomic discipline of the public sector set an example for 
the entire economy. Public sector discipline in spending ensured that abuse of rents 
created through government interventions were minimised. Fourth, institutional 
development was crucial to the success of the ‘market-friendly’ growth paradigm. 
The state, rather than supplanting the market, supported it.20 These features, 
collectively unique to East Asia, are used to justify support of market-oriented, 
outward-looking economic policies.21 In contrast to the neo-classical/liberal (and 
World Bank) explanation, a number of scholars have suggested that in any 
latecomer, state policies help to protect, promote and rationalise industry. This line 
                                                                                                                                                        
Perspectives, London: Frank Cass, p. 69. 
18 For a critique, see The Privatisation Network (1996): The Multinational Bid for Public 
Services, The Public Services Privatisation Unit, London, January. 
19 See Michael Malik, ‘Labor’s Business Mates: The ‘Corporate State’’, Far Eastern Economic 
Review (28 July 1988, p. 28). 
20 World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (1991), New York: Oxford University Press. In 
a later study, the highly celebrated ‘East Asian Miracle Report’, the Bank became a bit more 
explicit by pointing out the occasional need for an active state role in instances where social 
returns exceed private gain and some degree of intervention can then make a large difference. 
This is a middle ground strategy emphasising some intervention in getting the fundamentals right 
and ‘shared growth’, but it is not laissez faire nor active industrial policy. World Bank (1993), 
The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, New York: Oxford University 
Press. See also the compelling critique and discussion in Albert Fishlow et al. (1994), ‘Miracle or 
Design. Lessons From the East Asian Experience’, Policy Essay No.11, Washington D.C: 
Overseas Development Council. 
21 Neo-classical economists have attributed growth in the East Asian NICs and in Southeast Asia 
to government success at ‘getting prices right’, at letting free market-based price signals 
determine the most efficient allocation of resources for national economic growth.  
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of argument emphasises the strategic elements of policy that prove critical to 
maintain economic growth and develop industry.22
  
A strategic trade policy23 (which in reality is similar to a free trade strategy based 
on protectionism) is one whereby governments take action that gives commercial 
firms a credibility which they could not otherwise achieve. Technology stands at 
the center of such a policy and the strategy is concerned with the optimal way to 
combine protectionism, promote export-oriented industries and encourage 
international investment. Strategic trade policy maintains that comparative 
advantage can be changed through learning and through government action. This 
has been clearly shown by a number of East Asian countries which created 
competitive advantage through judicious interaction of government and private 
business.24
  
Strategic trade policy is in fact the neo-classical catchword for neo-mercantilism or 
one-way free trade.25 During the late 19th century, neo-mercantilism referred to the 
management of national economic and industrial policy, a concept given its most 
developed expression by Friedrich List. He pointed to the argument that the central 
importance of industry, and advocated a systematic, if essentially temporary, 
protection for a country’s infant industries. The successful promotion of national 
industries required the preservation or development of suitable institutions and 
socio-economic structures. The central idea of neo-mercantilism is that economic 
activities are and should be subordinated to the goal of state building. 
  
The essence of strategic trade policy cum neo-mercantilism lies in the efforts to 
promote national prosperity and to safeguard national interests by shielding the 
national economy against outside influences and through aggressive and 
discriminatory policies favouring domestic capital. 
  
                                                 
22 See the discussion in Robert Wade (1988), ‘The Role of Government in Overcoming Market 
Failure: Taiwan, Republic of Korea and Japan’, in Helen Hughes (ed.), Achieving Industrializa-
tion, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Robert Wade and Gordon White (1988), 
‘Developmental States and Markets in East Asia: An Introduction’, in Gordon White (ed.), 
Developmental States in East Asia, London: Macmillan; and Robert Wade (1992), ‘East Asia’s 
Economic Success. Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence’, World Politics 44 
(1), January. 
23 I use ‘strategic trade policy’ and ‘neo-mercantilist policy’ interchangeably. 
24 See among others, Alice Amsden (1989), Asia’s Next Giant. South Korea and Late 
Industrialization, New York: Oxford University Press. 
25  For this and the following see Johannes Schmidt, Models of Dirigisme in East Asia: 
Perspectives for Eastern Europe (1996), pp. 196-216 in Jacques Hersh and Johannes Schmidt 
(eds) The Aftermath of “Real Existing Socialism” in Eastern Europe. Between Western 
Europe and East Asia, Basingstoke, London and New York: Macmillan & St. Martin’s Press.  
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Therefore, by putting ‘politics in command’, the developmental state in the first- 
and second-tier NICs (Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) was a major factor in the 
success of East Asian late industrialisation and development.26 The model was 
based on the implementation of a specific understanding of political economy, 
whereby the state assumed the role of guiding the economy without disregarding 
the importance of the market. Government policy-making was organically tied to 
the production factors - land, labour and capital - in actively creating comparative 
advantages. This type of political economy system implied an evolutionary 
approach to economic -  and, presumably, political - development, and not a 
strategy of rapid radical reforms. In order to grasp the essence of the East Asian 
ideal-type developmental state, which has unfolded over time, with important 
deviations from country to country, it may be of interest to summarise some of its 
main characteristics:27
 
i) autonomy of the state (vis-à-vis interests groups); 
ii) state-exercised financial control over the economy; 
iii) co-ordinated or corporatised labour relations (either through the carrot or the 
stick); 
iv) bureaucratic autonomy (in key economic sectors); 
v) administrative guidance in giving preference to some industries over others; 
vi) favoured government treatment to private sector organisations, such as 
trading companies and industrial conglomerates (zaibatsu, keiretsu, chaebol 
or caifa); and 
vii) limited and controlled role for foreign capital. 
 
Meredith Woo-Cumings, after discussing these interventions, argues that: “This is 
an ideal-type of a statist utopia that would make Adam Smith turn over in his grave: 
the state wields power over society and the market at home, and holds foreign 
interests at bay by means of its formidable gate-keeping power.”28 State capacities 
and actions, however, never occur in isolation from the broader domestic and 
international environment. 
The State and Economic Development in East Asia 
East Asia’s economic strength was largely based on its ability to maximise its 
economic growth and exports and minimise imports. Its developmental model 
rested on a rejection of both communist-style state ownership of the economy and 
                                                 
26  The following is based on Jacques Hersh and Johannes Schmidt “Dirigism or Laissez –
Faire – Catching-up Strategies in the Global System After the Demise of Soviet-Style 
Command Economies. Working paper no. 54. pp, 10 
27 See also Chalmers Johnson (1987), ‘Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The 
Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan’, in Frederic C. Deyo 
(ed.), The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
28 Woo-Cumings, Meredith (1994), ‘The “New Authoritarianism” in East Asia’, Current History 
93 (587), p. 415. 
 
 
8
the neo-classical belief that free markets and minimal state interference were the 
answers. In contrast to the dominant Anglo-Saxon laissez-faire point of view, neo-
mercantilist ideals and practices shaped and fuelled Japan’s economy, and was also 
very influential in Taiwan and Korea until the financial deregulation took place in 
the late 1980s. Until then, all financial institutions had been nationalised and 
strategic industries were targeted for development and declining industries nurtured 
through a dynamic mixture of corporate collusion and competition. Industrial 
policies were implemented through a range of mechanisms, including subsidies, 
import barriers, technology infusions and export promotions through successful 
access of East Asian companies to the large markets of North America and Europe. 
  
Japan, and later on Korea and Taiwan, used the developmental state to improve 
their position in the world economy by holding back consumption and thereby 
increasing savings and channelling resources into industrial investment. This was 
made possible through a specific institutional set-up and its related capacity to 
implement certain industrial and trade policies. 
  
Each of the following fundamental characteristics is also found in the Japanese, 
Korean and Taiwanese institutional framework although with differing degrees, 
depending on pattern of historical evolution and trade-offs arising from stressing 
one issue more than the other:  
 
i) stable rule by a political-bureaucratic elite that does not accede to political 
demands that would undermine economic growth or security;  
ii) co-operation between public and private sectors under the overall guidance 
of a pilot planning agency;  
iii) heavy and continuing investment in education, combined with policies to 
ensure a relative equitable distribution of national income; and  
iv) a government that understands the need to use and respect methods of inter-
vention based on the price mechanism. Furthermore, the concept of dirigisme 
denotes a mix of political and economic functions where the notion is the 
‘government that governs best governs most’ (see also Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
State Intervention in East Asia Before Liberalisation   
 State Policies 
  
 Outcomes   
Neo-mercantilism 
  
Import Substitution/ 
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Export Orientation   
Non-welfare 
  
High savings/Low interest 
ates r  
Moderate consumerism 
  
Channelling of resources to 
ndustrial investment i  
State-productive/financial 
apital corporatism c
  
Exclusion of labour 
  
Soft authoritarianism 
  
Political stability    
U.S. security umbrella 
  
Non-defence 
 
 
Japanese industrial policies, and to a certain extent that of the states of Korea and 
Taiwan, were characterised by ‘controlled competition’ in which intense 
competition between firms in key industrial sectors was partly directed and at times 
limited by both state action and the formal and informal collaborative efforts 
between industrial and financial enterprises. The precise rules guiding the system 
evolved with the structure of the economy, the financial and market strength of the 
companies, and the political position and objectives of the bureaucracy.29   
  
The promotion of the state’s objectives in Japan were pursued through two sets of 
policies - those controlling the links between the Japanese market and international 
markets and those manipulating the domestic enterprises to stimulate expansion. 
T.J. Pempel once characterised the Japanese state as an ‘official doorman’ 
determining what, and under what conditions, capital, technology and manufactured 
products could enter and leave Japan. This pattern of controlled access, until 
recently, characterised the functioning of the Ministry of Finance which 
implemented policies involving selective controls over inward investment. The 
Ministry of International Trade & Industry (MITI) controlled technology imports in 
order to force foreigners to sell raw technology in the form of patents, licenses and 
expertise. 
  
The state in Japan used a system of non-compulsory indicative planning and 
administrative guidance to accomplish stated objectives. Government plans 
identified the strategic targets, provided guidance for industrial policy and bolstered 
confidence of the domestic business community.30 Plans were adjusted according to 
                                                 
29 Michael Borrus, Laura D’Andrea Tyson and John Zysman (1988), ‘Creating Advantage: How 
Government Policies Shape International Trade in the Semiconductor Industry’ in Paul R. 
Krugman (ed.), Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics, Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
30 The distinction between plan-rationality and market-rationality is made by Chalmers Johnson 
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changes in basic trends of supply and demand. According to Sato, in carrying out 
indicative planning, the Economic Planning Agency had a number of policy 
instruments at its disposal including expenditure policy, tax policy designed to 
promote savings in order to finance capital formation, various extensive off-budget 
activities such as funds collected by the Postal Savings System, subsidising 
industries through favouritism and protectionism, credit policy support, research 
and development policies that strongly favoured strategic technology innovation 
and application, agricultural policy that protected Japanese farmers’ interests and 
solidified political support from rural constituencies, and trade policy effectively 
promoting Japanese exports.31
  
These observations are consistent with Wade’s analysis of South Korea and Taiwan 
where the state actively intervened in the trade regime and managed commercial 
relations. Tariff and non-tariff instruments of protection (for instance, permitting 
imports of specific products only from countries that were non-competitive 
suppliers) continued to be significant in influencing the direction of 
industrialisation. In most instances, protection of the domestic market depended on 
the ability of companies to become competitive in international markets. During the 
same period, the state maintained tight control over foreign investment through 
industrial licensing, the imposition of local content requirements and by making 
protection of foreign investment conditional on performance. The state exerted tight 
control over the financial sector and allocation of credit, i.e. through exclusion of 
foreign banks. State-owned enterprises and parastatals played a significant 
leadership role in the corporate sector, enabling the authorities to direct 
discretionary investment incentives and determine which key sectors should be 
upgraded or downgraded.32
  
The case of Japan and the second-tier NICs suggests that the achievement of high-
speed economic growth depends on the state standing above vested interests to help 
create the social and political infrastructure for economic growth. In short, 
technocrats need a degree of insulation, but they cannot operate in isolation, even in 
an authoritarian setting.33 In Japan, for example, the importance of the autonomy of 
the bureaucracy rests on its pivotal position between the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) and big business. While the LDP had nominally controlled both the 
legislative and administrative branches of government for more than two decades, 
                                                                                                                                                        
(1986), ‘The Non-Socialist NICs: East Asia’, International Organization 40 (2). 
31 A useful discussion on the nature of indicative planning is found in Kazuo Sato (1990), 
‘Indicative Planning in Japan’, Journal of Comparative Economics 14, pp. 625-647. 
32 See the two concluding chapters in Robert Wade (1990), op cit. pp. 297-381. 
33 Evans (1992), p. 178. 
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public policy was, until recently, made by, and largely at the discretion of, senior 
bureaucrats.34
  
The Japanese state, which has been accused of having been a free-rider in the 
economies abroad, also escaped to a certain degree social obligations in the 
domestic context.35 The transformation of the Japanese economy from a warfare to 
a trading state within a brief period of time can be attributed to limited resources 
spent by the state in the defence and social sectors. Indeed, this complements the 
explanations mentioned above of how Japan has managed to continuously increase 
national capital accumulation in terms of trade surplus and other revenues cum 
profits.  
  
The gears of government and the private sector arguably do mesh better in Japan 
than in Southeast Asian NICs. Much of the credit for this goes to Japan’s powerful 
senior bureaucrats who provided the vital connections between political and 
business establishments on practically all important issues of public policy, and 
who methodically steered both sides towards national objectives. Ex-bureaucrats 
were until the 1990s highly prized in the corporate world because of their detailed 
knowledge of the inner workings of official policy-making and their wealth of 
personal connections in business, politics and the bureaucracy. 
 
Southeast Asian Economic Development: Impact of Foreign Capital 
Contrary to the acknowledged role of statism in the evolution of Japan’s economy, 
the ASEAN-436 has had a more dependent relationship with international capital to 
foster economic growth thus creating fertile ground for another type of political 
business alliance. The significance of international influence on the ASEAN-4 
economies was underlined by a 1996 UNCTAD report which issued a clear 
warning that these countries relied too heavily on foreign resources, both labour 
and capital: “Thus, the second-tier NIEs may be unable to sustain large current-
account deficits over the longer term; they need to reduce their trade deficits so as 
to minimize the risk of serious balance of payments problems and a sharp 
slowdown in growth. Much will depend on their success in enhancing their export 
potential through upgrading…. Without upgrading...FDI (foreign direct 
investments) will remain footloose and the economy would be highly vulnerable to 
interruptions of capital inflows. Concerns over such a possibility have been 
                                                 
34 Since the late 1980s, the autonomy of the bureaucracy has increasingly been challenged. Fierce 
inter-agency competition and a push from below by local constituencies for greater involvement 
in policy-making has complicated this quite static set-up between the LDP and the bureaucracy. 
35 Numerous complaints have been made, especially by the US, about Japan’s ruthless attack on 
global markets and its bombardment of trading partners with products, disregarding local 
industrial or economic conditions.  
36 Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. 
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growing in Thailand and even more in Malaysia in view of their large current 
account deficits.”37  
 
Much of the FDI in Southeast Asia since late 1980s had its origin in East Asia, first 
from Japan and subsequently from Taiwan and Korea. As illustrated in Table 2, 
Malaysia was the main destination of FDI while Indonesia and Thailand were less 
important in terms of total FDI flows between in1985 and 1994. The Philippines 
were least important, suggesting that there is some credence to the thesis that an 
unstable political climate and a weak state with a limited capacity to impose 
coherent policies attracts little foreign capital. One major weakness of the second-
tier NICs was noted in UNCTAD’s 1996 Trade and Development Report, that with 
the important exception of the Philippines, the other three Southeast Asian 
economies were praised for the successful policies which had helped in establishing 
competitive resource- and labour-intensive industries, but the easy stage of export 
promotion was coming to an end. Already here UNCTAD issued a clear warning: 
“noting that growth in the region relied excessively on foreign resources, both 
labour and capital,” thus, “[m]uch will depend on their success in enhancing their 
export potential through upgrading … Without upgrading … FDI will remain 
footloose and the economy would be highly vulnerable to interruptions of capital 
inflows.”38
 
FDI moved into a number of export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) sectors across 
the region where supply far out-stripped demand. Steel, cars, petrochemicals and 
semiconductors, to name a few, were industries where massive foreign investment 
was made on the unquestioned assumption that record-beating growth would 
continue indefinitely. The extremely large inflows of productive capital did benefit 
high-speed growth; for example, in the second half of the 1980s, Malaysia, 
Thailand and Indonesia experienced similar growth rates as South Korea and 
Taiwan in the 1970s, but contrary to their experience the Southeast Asian countries 
did not build on an experience of successful import-substitution. Unlike the case of 
East Asia, in Southeast Asia, export-oriented manufacturing soon came to be 
dominated by subsidiaries of transnational corporations (TNCs).39
 
Table 2.2 
DFI Flows to Southeast Asian Countries, 1985-1994 (US$ million) 
                                                 
37 Trade and Development Report 1996, UNCTAD, Geneva, pp. 102 and 123. 
38 See Yilmaz Akyüz (1998), ‘The East Asian Financial Crisis: Back to the Future’, paper 
presented at a seminar on ‘Impacts of the Asian Currency Crisis on Europe’s Growth Prospects’, 
EIAS, Brussels, 20 January, pp. 1-2. 
39 Mitchell Bernard and John Ravenhill (1995), ‘Beyond Product Cycles and Flying Geese. 
Regionalization, Hierarchy, and the Industrialization of East Asia’, World Politics 47, January, p. 
172.  
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Country 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
 
Indonesia 310 1,093 1,482 1,777 2,004 2,109 
Philippines 12 530 544 228 763 1,000 
Thailand 163 2,444 2,014 2,116 1,726 640 
Malaysia 695 2,333 3,998 5,183 5,006 4,348 
 
Source: World Bank (1996), Managing Capital Flows in East Asia, Washington D.C: World 
Bank, p. 28. 
 
In some cases, Southeast Asia emerged as a lucrative market for TNC products. 
One example is Toyota, which invested heavily in the region in order to reduce its 
dependency on the US car market. Thailand became the company’s second largest 
market in 1996, and Toyota-Astra Motor accounted for a similar share of the 
Indonesian market.40 Another heavyweight in terms of FDI in Southeast Asia is 
Seagate Technology Inc., a leading manufacturer of disk drives, and a prototype 
‘stateless corporation’, moving first to Singapore and then to Thailand. The 
presence of Seagate, as well as other TNC’s such as Mitsubishi, Motorola, Texas 
International, Intel, National Semiconductor and Harris (formerly RCA), in the 
ASEAN-4 economies indicates their heavy reliance on foreign capital to generate 
growth.  
 
Corporate Japan has a particularly strong presence in Southeast Asia. Japanese 
affiliates employed an estimated 800,000 people across ASEAN economies in 
1994. In a number of key industries, Japanese firms have staked out a commanding 
regional position, with Matsushita Electrical Co. Ltd.’s operations alone said to 
account for between 4 percent and 5 percent of Malaysia’s  gross domestic product. 
Japanese manufacturers currently control about 90 percent of the automotive 
market in most ASEAN countries.41 Yet, and more importantly, there is little 
evidence that most of these TNCs have shown great reluctance to transfer 
technology to their joint venture partners in the region, an issue openly lamented by 
some Southeast Asian leaders. There are, however, nationalist incentives as well 
simple altruistic considerations which condition the view of state and policy elites 
to nurture and co-ordinate FDI. Moreover, this dependency on foreign capital to 
promote economic development creates much space for corruption in developing 
                                                 
40 Gavin Boyd (1989), Pacific Trade, Investment and Politics, Pinter: London, p. 114. 
41 Quoted in Robert Wade (1994), ‘Selective Industrial Policies in East Asia: Is The East Asian 
Miracle Right?’, in Albert Fishlow et al., op cit., pp. 66-67. See also Walden Bello (1997), 
‘Addicted to Capital: The Ten-Year High and Present-Day Withdrawal Trauma of Southeast 
Asian Economies’, www.focusweb.org/focus/library. 
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economies.42
 
Dependency theorists have noted three important points about investments by 
TNCs.43 First, the advantages of foreign direct investments are unequally 
distributed between TNCs and host countries because TNCs have the ability to 
absorb gains that could otherwise be reinvested. Second, TNCs create distortions in 
the economy by displacing domestic production, utilising inappropriate technology 
and distorting consumer tastes. In addition, their behaviour leads to a worsening of 
income distribution. Third, TNCs may pervert, undermine or influence the political 
system of host countries.44
  
Peter Evans has noted the different outcomes of the alliances created between 
TNCs and politicians in host societies.45 Recognition of the importance of state 
capacity, not simply in the sense of the power of technocrats within the state 
apparatus but also in the sense of an institutional structure that is durable and 
effective, is characteristic of what Evans terms “the third wave of thinking about 
state and development.”46 The East Asian states are what Evans terms ‘embedded 
states’ which, in contrast to the ‘predatory’s tate such as Zaire, has a large degree of 
autonomy which “depends on an apparently contradictory combination of Weberian 
bureaucratic insulation with intense immersion in the surrounding social structure. 
                                                 
42 Corruption has become a widespread global problem, with TNCs sometimes paying huge 
bribes to win business. Bribes usually consist of approximately 10-20 percent of the costs of a 
deal, which may be paid to both public officials and politicians. What is most significant, 
however, is the fact that this amount in many cases is added to the total cost of the business deal. 
See for instance George Moody-Stuart (1997), Grand Corruption, How Business Bribes 
Damages Developing Countries, Oxford: WorldView Publishing. 
43 There is some concern over the influence of TNCs in the world economy. At the end of the 20th 
century, TNCs accounted for 80-90 percent of world trade (excluding the former planned 
economies, though even in these economies it has acquired more than a foothold interest). The 
pace of capital concentration into fewer and larger corporations has been sped up to levels 
hitherto unimagined. For a further discussion on TNC influence in the global economy, see 
Frederick C. Clairmonte (1988), The Political Economy of Transnational Power in Partisan 
Scholarship: Essays in Honour of Renato Constantino, JCA, Manila. 
44 Volker Bornschier and Hanspeter Stamm (1990), ‘Transnational Corporations’, Current 
Sociology 38 (2/3), Autumn/Winter, p. 206. 
45 Peter Evans (1979a), Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local 
Capital in Brazil, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Peter Evans (1987), ‘Class, State, 
and Dependence in East Asia: Lessons for Latin Americanists’, in Frederic C. Deyo (ed.), The 
Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Peter Evans 
(1992), ‘The State as a Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural 
Change’, in Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (eds), The Politics of Economic 
Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
46 Evans 1992: 141. 
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How this contradictory combination is achieved depends, of course, on both the 
historically determined character of the state apparatus and the nature of their social 
structure in which it is embedded...” 47  
 
The institutional capacity of the state depends on the nature of the state of which 
Evans has noted three different types. The ‘predatory state’, with Zaire as an 
example, lacks bureaucratic capacity and has a weak organisational structure in its 
domestic setting. Furthermore, the state lacks autonomy in its ties with international 
actors and institutions which affects its capacity to bargain effectively, especially 
since it is kleptopatrimonialist in the sense that it is highly corrupt and rent-seeking 
is widespread through a personalised rule and a more or less uncontrolled market. 
An example of the ‘intermediate state’ is Brazil. The state’s internal structure is 
fragmented, divided, segmented and unstable but occasionally it has had a degree of 
embedded autonomy vis-a-vis external forces. In contrast, the ‘developmental state’ 
has a high degree of embedded autonomy and some degree of insulation and social 
connectedness. The state is supported by a stable, coherent and comprehensive 
bureaucratic organisation, what Evans calls “reinforced Weberianism.” 
  
The essential argument made by Evans on the role of the state in development can 
be encapsulated in three points.48 First, developmental outcomes depend on both the 
general character of state structures and the roles states pursue. Second, state 
involvement can be associated with transformation even if we take sectoral policies 
such as labour policy, land reforms or other redistributive policies as measures. 
Finally, an analysis of states and industrial transformation cannot stop with the 
emergence of the industrial landscape. Successful transformation changes the 
nature of the state’s private counterparts, making effective future state involvement 
dependent on the reconstruction of state-society ties.  
  
In Southeast Asia, TNCs have been more concerned with establishing ties with the 
domestic political elite in an attempt to penetrate the market. TNC penetration into 
the Southeast Asian economy has primarily been through joint ventures. The TNCs 
in Southeast Asia also tend to establish political business alliances which were 
potentially profitable for them and the domestic political elite but not in the national 
interest.  
  
In Thailand, for example, local businessmen have managed to develop their 
corporate base by establishing ties with the political elite as well as with foreign 
enterprises. Some businessmen have also used such ties to secure political power. 
For this reason, many of the decisions taken by the cabinet and ministries involved 
in implementation of key projects were made in a manner baffling to all but those 
                                                 
47 Evans 1992: 154. 
48 Evans 1995: 17. 
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firms won the contracts. This situation gave rise to widespread speculation that 
corruption was rife within the state, and the government’s perceived failure to 
address this problem was considered by many as sufficient proof of extensive 
corruption. One example was the privatization of telecommunications services by 
the government, indicative of what has bee n referred to as the ‘perfect connections’ 
required to rapidly build up an enterprise.49 Taksin Shinawatra, a retired police 
colonel and scion of a prominent northern Thai family known for its silk-fabric 
business, who had good relations with the Thai bureaucracy had left his job in 
police-information processing to sell and lease IBM computers to the government. 
As IBM’s sole agent in Thailand, Shinawatra built up a 90 percent market share of 
computer sales. Shinawatra also secured a deal to sell equipment to a US$6 billion 
project undertaken jointly by British Telecom and the Charoen Pokphand group, a 
leading Sino-Thai enterprise; the project involved the installation of two million 
telephone lines in Bangkok and one million lines in rural areas.50 Shinawatra 
subsequently entered mainstream politics and is now seen as a potential candidate 
for the post of Prime Minister of Thailand.  
  
In Malaysia, the government’s liberalisation polices have been primarily 
responsible for the surge in foreign and domestic investment which fuelled 
economic growth, particularly after a severe recession in the mid-1980s. However, 
the privatisation policy, part of the government’s liberalisation initiatives, became 
an important avenue through which members of the ruling United Malays’ National 
Organisation (UMNO) and well-connected businessmen have benefited from state 
patronage. Many of these privatised contracts have been implemented through 
joint-ventures with foreign companies.51  
  
While there is a productive dimension to FDI, i.e. they take over and control 
productive manufacturing enterprises in ASEAN, there has also been unproductive 
investments in stocks (i.e. direct portfolio investments – DPI) and property as well 
as loans from foreign banks. Like Thailand, the Philippines liberalised the foreign 
capital account in the mid-1990s and the banking sector with the result that between 
1993 and 1997, approximately US$19.4 billion worth of net portfolio investment 
flowed into the country. These flows dwarfed the FDI inflows, with estimates of 
DPI volume ranging from 75 to 90 percent of total investment.52 In Thailand, by 
1996, local companies and individuals had loans totalling more than US$70 billion 
– a figure equivalent to more than half the country’s gross domestic product. Thai 
                                                 
49 Far Eastern Economic Review (6 December 1990: p. 18). 
50 Paul Handley, ‘Thai Telecoms Firm is Politically Astute: Contact Network’, Far Eastern 
Economic Review (13 December 1990: p. 70). 
51 See the chapter on Malaysia in this volume for an in-depth discussion on UMNO patronage and 
the implementation of privatised contracts with the support of foreign enterprises. 
52 Bello, op cit. pp.9. 
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companies over-invested in redundant manufacturing, and especially in property 
and land. By the beginning of 1997, half of the loans made to property developers 
were non-performing.  
 
The role of foreign funds flows into the ASEAN-4 in the form of FDI and FPI 
indicates the various forms in which foreign capital operates in these economies. As 
noted by Rajah Rasiah: “It is clear that free currency and capital markets exposed 
the crisis-affected Southeast Asian economies to substantial systemic risks, 
destabilizing them seriously when external volatility suddenly exploded.”53 
Although dependency may facilitate increased productivity and enhance skill 
formation, it can also inhibit indigenous innovation. Dependency can also create 
political sensitivity among bureaucrats and politicians who might perceive it as an 
obstacle to their policy and power options.54
  
Besides the prominent role of foreign capital in the ASEAN-4 economies, 
companies controlled by ethnic Chinese have proven to be the most dynamic 
among domestic enterprises. Chinese ownership and control of the ASEAN-4 
economies has been an issue of great sensitivity in these multi-racial societies. 
None of the NICs has ever had to cope with anything like this. While ethnic 
Chinese entrepreneurial skills have been beneficial in contributing to the opening 
up of the regions and societies where indigenous enterprise and capital were 
scarce,55 the social and political problems associated with the Chinese minorities 
are quite disproportionate to the numbers involved because of their high socio-
economic status. All four ASEAN governments have, at times, sacrificed 
efficiency-maximising considerations for the imperatives of economic nationalism 
involving measures disadvantageous to ethnic Chinese. Measures of this kind have 
been blatantly discriminatory during the last thirty years or so (except in the past 
two decades in Thailand), and it will probably be a long time before it ceases to be 
                                                 
53 Quoted in Rajah Rasiah (2000) From Dragons to Dwarfs: Re-examining  Neo-Liberal 
Explanations of the Southeast Asian Financial Crisis, Development Research Series, Working 
Paper no. 84, DIR, Aalborg University, p.20. 
54 For an excellent discussion of dependency’s impact in the region, see Bernard and Ravenhill, 
op cit. pp. 208-09. 
55 On the early history of Southeast Asian Chinese, see William Skinner (1957), Chinese in 
Thailand: An Analytical History, Ithaca: Cornell University Press and M. Somers-Heidhues 
(1974), Southeast Asia’s Chinese Minorities, Hawthorn: Longmans Southeast Asia Series. 
For a contemporary account of Chinese enterprises in Southeast Asia, see Edmund Terence 
Gomez (1999), Chinese Business in Malaysia: Accumulation, Accommodation and 
Ascendance, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, D. Chirot and A. Reid (eds) (1997), 
Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and 
Central Europe, Seattle: University of Washington Press and Ruth McVey (ed.) (1992), 
Southeast Asian Capitalists, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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a constraint upon government policy-making.56 Moreover, the Chinese remain open 
to allegations of wealth concentration which has undermined the development of 
indigenous capital in spite of the extensive control of the state over the economy in 
most of these ASEAN-4 countries. Such allegations usually arise during periods of 
economic crisis. For example, the significance and collusion of ethnic Chinese and 
foreign capital allegedly partly explains the financial crisis in the ASEAN-4, 
specifically in Indonesia and Thailand. Undoubtedly, however, many of the 
indigenous business elite has established similar corporate ties with foreign capital 
to promote their economic interests. 
 
The role of Chinese business in the ASEAN-4 is still limited with regard to its 
capacity to influence economic policy formulation and implementation. Despite the 
fact that there are considerable differences in the structure of political business ties 
among domestic players, it can, however, safely be claimed that ties between state 
and capital, from the outset, were also created by policy elites with a nation-
building perspective in mind and as a means to develop indigenous capital. Such 
ties also served to check the growing influence of foreign capital in the ASEAN-4 
economies. In Malaysia and Indonesia, political business ties were a means to 
check the influence of Chinese capital interests; in both countries, although capital 
accumulation by Chinese enterprises has been significant, Chinese capital remains 
very subservient to the state.  
  
An important difference can be noted here between the impact of political business 
ties in Southeast Asia as compared to East Asia. In early stages of development in 
Japan, and later on in South Korea – as was the case in the US and Germany – 
political business alliances led to the development of what can be termed as 
‘nurtured entrepreneurs’. In these cases, a strong business sector was nurtured and 
subsidised by an autonomous state behind protective walls. In Southeast Asia, 
however, the evidence suggests that what emerged were primarily ‘dependent 
comprador political business alliances’, i.e. weak indigenous capital operating in an 
economy characterised by the strong position of ethnic Chinese enterprises along 
with a dependence on foreign capital to promote economic growth. The result was a 
“lack of institutional deepening to sustain efficiency improvements”, and this 
“seriously restricted the performance of real sector firms.”57
 
The State, Corruption and Corporate Development 
The development of the economy in East and Southeast Asia following 
democratisation brings into question the conventional wisdom that the free market 
and democracy are hinder corruption in government. In their report entitled, ‘The 
                                                 
56 J.A.C. Mackie (1988), ‘Economic Growth in the ASEAN Region: The Political 
Underpinnings’, Helen Hughes (ed.), Achieving Industrialization, pp. 297-98. 
57 Rajah Rasiah, op.cit, pp 18. 
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New Corruption’, Barbara Harriss-White and Gordon White noted that58  “in some 
contexts . . . the amount of corruption has increased along with and apparently as 
result of economic liberalisation.” The replacement of discretionary controls over 
prices and the production and distribution of goods and services should according 
to theory limit the scope for rent-seeking behaviour within the state. A separate 
report, based on empirical studies in southern India suggests that deregulation may 
be accompanied by “mutations in relations of corruption” or it just displaces 
corruption to other actors and spheres of activities. In other words, Asia is dealing 
with new forms of graft that have adjusted to or are products of liberalisation and 
deregulation. 
  
If economic reform does not automatically quell corruption, neither does 
democracy. Following the 1996 general election in Thailand, which was widely 
regarded as the ‘dirtiest’ ever, some observers concluded that democratic politics 
stimulated corruption. In this environment, in the implementation of Thailand’s 
development plans, especially infrastructure projects, there were numerous avenues 
for politicians with the help of foreign and domestic capital to indulge in illegal 
money-raising activities. In the Philippines, bribery allegations threatened to turn 
the US$2.3 billion Manila Bay land-development project into the biggest scandal of 
President Fidel Ramos’s tenure. Opposition senators claimed the project’s 
developer paid kickbacks to officials of the government agency that sold the land 
and to Ramos’ Lakas-NUCD Party.  
  
In South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, instances of corruption have typically 
come to light in the wake of political upheaval, as new leaders try to gain mileage 
by taking their predecessors to task for past offences. Similar allegations of 
corruption, involving nepotism and cronyism, were made by Malaysia’s former 
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim when he was removed from office by Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad. The scale of political patronage in Malaysia, 
especially through privatisation, has been significant, justified as a means to 
improve the efficiency of public enterprises, though it has led to numerous 
allegations corruption and conflicts-of-interest involving senior politicians. While 
most recipients of political patronage depend heavily on foreign or Malaysian 
Chinese companies to implement the concessions they secure from the government, 
questions have also been raised of the form of corporate development undertaken 
by those privies to much state support.  
  
One of the most important lessons of the financial crisis is that Southeast Asia’s 
remarkable rates of economic growth, together with the emergence of new 
                                                 
58 This and the following is quoted from Aparisim Ghosh et al., ‘Corruption: Reform’s Dark 
Side’ (Far Eastern Economic Review 20 Mar 1997, p. 18). 
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corporate high fliers, have to a very large degree been a phenomena that has 
masked the reality that many of the largest enterprises possess few of the 
fundamentals necessary for long-term viability. Southeast Asia’s industrial growth 
has, in contrast to Japan and the second-tier NICs, been too heavily dependent on 
foreign investment and technology, devoid of an indigenous technological culture 
or a domestic base of capital for long-term productive investment. Instead, a 
business culture has been incubated involving much short-term speculative activity 
in trade, finance and property, combined with a scramble to seek profits and 
commercial advantage through political patronage. The dynamism of these 
economies is attributable primarily to foreign investors and to the ubiquitous 
Chinese enterprises which tend to dominate the most productive domestic side of 
economic activity.59  
 
In conclusion, the state in Southeast Asia has not been successful in nurturing 
entrepreneurial domestic capitalists in spite of the extensive state support the latter 
has received. The key difference in political business ties in the ASEAN-4 as 
opposed to the NICs is that the former have relied to heavily on foreign capital and 
has not managed to develop a significant number of independent, dynamic, growth-
oriented large-scale enterprises. One reason for this is that the ties between 
politicians and business in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia (and 
to a certain degree Korea) have been far too close. This was not the case in 
Singapore, the one country which has a strong state and minimal corruption. In 
Taiwan, the KMT had been financially independent of capitalists and KMT leaders 
never saw the need to cultivate close ties with businessmen. The extent of 
autonomy of the state from business suggests that this enables the state to act in the 
national interest as well as keep a check on corruption.  
  
I have argued that the financial crisis was not triggered by a unique East Asian 
model of statism creating distortions and inefficiencies and involving a specific 
mode of cronyism or political business with the direct consequence of misallocation 
of resources. This study does, however, argue that economic liberalisation does not 
necessarily lead to a reduction of corruption. In fact, the basic problem is 
underregulated markets, at both the national and international levels, indicating the 
need to discipline markets and steer policies in a predetermined direction in the 
national interest. 
                                                 
59 Richard Robison, ‘Doing it their way’, review of Behind the Myth: Business, Money and 
Power in Southeast Asia by James Clad, London: Unwin Hyman in Far Eastern Economic 
Review 8 Feburary 1990, p. 36. 
 
 
21
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH SERIES 
 
WORKING PAPERS: 
 
 
No.  1: Olav Jull Sørensen: Marketing Issues in Peasant Agricultural Development, 55pp, 
1983. 
 
No.  2: Hans Gullestrup: The Ecol-Humanistic Technology - the new Technology as 
Experiences from the Past, 33pp, 1983. 
 
No.  3: Georg Sørensen: Transnationals and the Transfer of Technology to the Third 
World, 31pp, 1984. 
 
No.  4: Georg Sørensen: International Bureaucracies and Aid: The Political Economic of 
the 'B-Share', 11pp, 1984. 
 
No.  5: Georg Sørensen: Notes on Materialism and Boredom - Western Development 
Ideals, 12pp, 1984. 
 
No.  6: Olav Jull Sørensen: Marketing Systems and Economic Development. An Institutio-
nal-Structural Approach, 41pp, 1984. 
 
No.  7: Georg Sørensen: How much Poison is Another Man's Meat? - Notes on the Logic 
of World Systems Analysis, 29pp, 1984. 
 
No.  8: Georg Sørensen: Peace and Development: Looking for the Right Track, 18pp, 
1984. 
 
No.  9: Georg Sørensen: The Twists and Turns of Development Theory - A Comment on 
"The European Experience" by Dieter Senghaas. 19pp, 1984. 
 
No. 10: Jacques Hersh & Ellen Brun: Aspects of Soviet Participation in a Shifting World 
Economy. 45pp, 1984. 
 
No. 11: Olav Jull Sørensen: Marketing System Development and Labour Migration: 
Analysis and Consequences. 41pp, 1984. 
 
No. 12: Georg Sørensen: How Cold is the Second Cold War? - An Assessment of the 
Scope of 'the Great Contest'. 23pp, 1984. 
 
No. 13: John E. Kuada: Agricultural Development in the Third World. 23pp, 1984. 
 
No. 14: Olav Jull Sørensen: Profiles of Tanzanian Peasants and their Marketing Implica-
tions. 52pp, 1984. 
 
No. 15: Jørgen Kristiansen: Urban Passenger Transport in Developing Countries - Socio-
economic Impact and the Choice of Technology. 58pp, 1985. 
 
No. 16: John E. Kuada: Marketing Systems in a Development Process. 35pp, 1985. 
 
No. 17: Georg Sørensen: Some Contradictions in a Rich Concept on Development. 14pp, 
1985. 
 
No. 18: Olav Jull Sørensen: Marketing of Agricultural Inputs/Implements and Profiles of 
Farmers in Kenya: Project Preparations. 47pp, 1986. 
 
No. 19: Georg Sørensen: Development Through the Eyes of a Child. 17pp, 1986. 
 
No. 20: Georg Sørensen: International and External Intertwined: 5 Obstacles to Develop-
ment in India. 20pp, 1986. 
 
No. 21: John E. Kuada: Macro-Micro Integrated Framework for Market Opportunity 
Analysis and Project Selection. 14pp, 1986. 
 
No. 22: Olav Jull Sørensen: Co-operatives: Movement-to-Movement Cooperation. Some 
Conceptual Views. 15pp, 1986. 
 
No. 23: John E. Kuada: Financing Rural Food Marketing Systems in Ghana. 16pp, 1986. 
 
No. 24: Hans Gullestrup: Culture, Cultural Analysis and Cultural Ethics - Or What Divides 
and What Unites Us? (Out of print) (in Danish). 84pp, 1987. 
 
No. 24a: Hans Gullestrup: Culture, Cultural Analysis and Cultural Ethics - Or What Divides 
and What Unites Us? (Second revised edition) (Out of print) (in Danish). 92pp, 
1988. 
 
No. 25: John E. Kuada: Food Marketing in Ghana, the Role of Rural Food Traders. 53pp, 
1988. 
 
No. 26: Henrik A. Nielsen: Monitoring Rural Development in Bangladesh. 22pp, 1989. 
 
No. 27: Hans Gullestrup: The Ethical Dilemma in the Intercultural Co-operation, or: The 
Development Aid Worker=s Personal Problem (in Danish). 26 pp, 1991. 
 
No. 28: Chaiwoot Chaipan: Current Issues on Economic Development in East and 
Southeast Asia. 24pp, 1991. 
 
No. 29: Henrik Nielsen: Databased Information on Danida-Projects 1962-91: Overview and 
Analysis of the Daniproj-Database. 55pp, 1992. 
 
No. 30: Hans Gullestrup: Evaluating Social Consequences of Social Changes in the Third 
World Countries. 24pp, 1993. 
 
No. 31: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: In The Shadow of the Pacific Century - 
Comparative Perspectives on Externalities Influence on Economic Policy-Making 
in Southeast Asian Would-be NICs. 106pp, 1993. 
 
No. 32: Henrik A. Nielsen: Local Community Development Around the Bay of Bengal: 
Context, Crises and Perspectives. 27pp, 1994. 
 
No. 33: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Southeast Asian State Responses to a Regionalized 
World Economy. 21pp, 1994.  
 
No. 34: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Semi-autonomy in Economic Policy-making: The 
Case of Thailand. 28pp, 1994.  
 
No. 35: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Increasing Exports in a Decreasing World Market: 
The Role of Developmental States in the ASEAN-4. 27pp, 1994.  
 
No. 36: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: State Capacities and Bargaining Strategies in the 
Global Disorder. 14pp, 1994. 
 
No. 37: Samir Amin: The Future of Global Polarization. 17pp, 1994.  
 
No. 38: Peter W. Cunningham: The Re-affirmation of State Socialism. The South African 
Debate. 17pp, 1995. 
 
No. 39: Andre Gunder Frank: Nothing New in the East: No New World Order. 28pp, 1994. 
 
No. 40: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: State Intervention in Southeast Asia. Creating 
Growth without Welfare. 20pp, 1994. 
 
No. 41: Garry Rodan: Ideological Convergences Across 'East' and 'West': The New 
Conservative Offensive. 24pp, 1995. 
 
No. 42:  Jacques Hersh: North Korea: Ideal-Type Anomaly. 18pp, 1995. 
 
No. 43: Research Centre for Development and International Relations (DIR), Johannes 
Dragsbaek Schmidt et al. (eds.): Research Program 1995-1997. Globalization and 
Social Change - Structures, Systems and Unidisciplinary Research. 74pp, 1995. 
 
No. 44: Feiwel Kupferberg: Ethno-nationalism, Liberal Democracy and the Psychology of 
the Post Cold War Era. 19pp, 1995. 
 
No. 45: Feiwel Kupferberg: Uncertainty, Chaos and Learning: Prolegomenon to a 
Sociology of Creativity. 27pp, 1995. 
 
No. 46: Feiwel Kupferberg: Strategic Learning: East Germany as a "Model Case" for 
Transformation Theory. 26pp, 1995. 
 
No. 47: Li Xing: China and East Asia vs. The West: Controversies, Clashes and Challenges. 
19pp, 1995. 
 
No. 48: Kwang-Yeong Shin: Democratization and Class Politics in Korea, 1987 - 1993. 
20pp, 1995. 
 
No. 49: Joachim Hirsch: Regulation Theory and its Applicability to Studies on 
Globalization and Social Change. 12pp, 1995. 
 
No. 50: Ellen Brun: The New Social Contract: Sustainability from below. 20pp, 1995. 
 
No. 51: Li Xing: The Dynamics of East Asian Intra-Regional Economic Relations. 22pp, 
1995. 
 
No. 52: Kwang-Yeong Shin: Characteristics of the East Asian Economic System: 
Authoritarian Capitalism and The Developmental State. 33pp, 1996. 
 
No. 53: Li Xing: Playing Democracy and Human Rights. The International System and the 
China-West Case. 17pp, 1996. 
 
No. 54: Jacques Hersh & Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Dirigisme or Laissez-Faire? - 
Catching-up Strategies in the Global System After the Demise of Soviet-Style 
Command Economies. 22pp, 1996. 
 
No. 55: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt & Jacques Hersh: Peace Convergence and Political 
Legitimacy in Israel and Palestine. 16pp, 1997. 
 
No. 56: David Harvey: Globalization in Question. 22pp, 1997. 
 
No. 57: Amiya Kumar Bagchi: In Praise of the Developmental State. 35pp, 1997. 
 
No. 58: Su-Hoon Lee: The Rise of Environmentalism in South Korea. 31pp, 1997. 
 
No. 59: Mark Beeson & Kanishka Jayasuriya: The Politics of Regionalism: APEC and the 
EU in Comparative Perspective. 37pp, 1997. 
 
No. 60: Manfred Bienefeld: The State and Civil Society: The Political Economy of the 
ANew Social Policy@. 35pp, 1997. 
 
No. 61: Duncan McCargo: Problematising Democratisation: The Thai Case. 22pp, 1997. 
 
No. 62: Li Xing: Conceptualizing the Crisis of Socialism: A Gramscian Approach. Some 
Reflections on the Chinese Socialist Experience. 41 pp, 1998. 
 
No. 63: Henrik A. Nielsen: Decentralising the Monitoring of Development Intervention: 
From Local Government Impact-Monitoring. 116pp, 1998. 
 
No. 64: Suresh Narayanan: From Miracle to Realities: The Malaysian Economy in Crisis.  
26 pp, 1998. 
 
No. 65: Li Xing, Jacques Hersh & Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: The Rise and Fall of East 
Asian Capitalism: Back to the future? 30 pp, 1998. 
 
No. 66: Jan Oberg: Globalization and Responses by Civil Society to Humanitarian 
Emergencies. 44 pp, 1998. 
 
No. 67: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Development Theory and the Crisis of the State. 30 
pp, 1998. 
 
No. 68:  Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt, Jacques Hersh and Li Xing (eds.) and members of 
DIR: Research Program 1998-2000 Globalization and Social Change 
Interdisciplinary Critical Perspectives. 81 pp, 1998. 
 
No. 69: Katarina Tomaševski: Human Rights in International Development Co-operation: 
Between Politics and Policy. 69 pp, 1999. 
 
No. 70: Mammo Muchie: Problems of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Renewal in the Era of 
Globalisation. 32 pp, 1999. 
 
No. 71: Wolfgang Sachs: Globalization and Sustainability. 38 pp, 1999. 
 
No. 72: Xing Li: The Market Approach to Industrialization: A Critique of China´s 
Experiment. 37 pp, 1999. 
 
No. 73: Bob Jessop: The State and the Contradictions of the Knowledge-Driven Economy. 
37 pp, 1999. 
 
No. 74: Bob Jessop: What follows Fordism? On the Periodization of Capitalism and its 
Regulation. 36 pp, 1999. 
 
No. 75:  Mammo Muchie: Climbing the Value-Added Chain in Leather Manufacture: Lessons 
from the Indian Case to Enhance Value-Added Leather Processing in Ethiopia and 
Kenya. 26pp, 2000.  
 
No. 76:  Stanislav Menshikov: Macropolicies to Help Re-Start Economic Growth in Russia. 
44 pp, 2000. 
 
No. 77:  Stanislav Menshikov: Indicators and Trends of Economic Globalisation. 26 pp, 
2000. 
 
No. 78:  Stanislav Menshikov: The Role of International Capital Flows: How to Reduce the 
Vulnerability of the Global Economy. 23 pp, 2000. 
 
No. 79: Mammo Muchie: The Way Africa Entered The Millennium: Trousers and Skirts 
down or Head High: A Commentary. 19 pp, 2000. 
No. 80: Manfred Bienefeld: Globalisation and Social Change: Drowning in the Icy Waters 
of Commercial Calculation. 48 pp, 2000. 
 
No. 81: Mammo Muchie: From Protest to Sanitation: Critical Reflections on the UN´s 
Discourse of Environmentally friendly Technologies. 24 pp, 2000. 
 
No. 82: Jacques Hersh: Globalization and Regionalization: Two Facets of One Process. 22 
pp, 2000. 
 
No. 83: Mammo Muchie: Towards a Theory for Re-framing Pan-Africanism: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come. 30 pp, 2000. 
 
No. 84: Rajah Rasiah: From Dragons to Dwarfs: Reexamining Neo-Liberal Explanations of 
the Southeast Asian Financial Crisis. 23 pp, 2000. 
 
No. 85: Jacques Hersh: The Constraints of World Capitalism in Catching up. 35 pp, 2000. 
 
No. 86: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt: Political Business as Usual-Comparing Public-
Private Partnerships in East and Southeast Asia. 22 pp, 2000. 
 
 
